Abstract-The aggressive scaling of semiconductor technology has significantly increased the radiation-induced soft-error rate in modern microprocessors. Meanwhile, due to the increasing complexity of modern processor pipelines and the limited error-tolerance capabilities that previous radiation hardening techniques can provide, the existing pipeline protection mechanisms cannot achieve complete protection. This paper proposes a complete and cost-effective pipeline protection mechanism using a self-checking architecture. The radiation-hardened pipeline is achieved by incorporating soft-error-and timing-error-tolerant flip-flop (SETTOFF)-based self-checking cells into the sequential cells of the pipeline. A replay recovery mechanism is also developed at the architectural level to recover the detected errors. The proposed pipeline protection technique is implemented in an OpenRISC microprocessor in a 65-nm technology. A gate-level transient fault-injection and analysis technique is used to evaluate the error-tolerance capability of the proposed hardened pipeline design. The results show that compared with the techniques such as triple modular redundancy, the SETTOFF-based self-checking technique requires over 30% less area and 80% less power overheads. Meanwhile, the error-tolerant and self-checking capabilities of the register allow the proposed pipeline protection technique to provide a noticeably higher level of reliability for different parts of the pipeline compared with the previous pipeline protection techniques.
Conventionally, the microprocessors used in safety-critical applications, such as space, can be protected by triple modular redundancy (TMR) [1] . However, the TMR is not a viable solution for less critical applications since its overhead (more than 200% area and power) is far too expensive. There is a room, therefore, for compromise techniques that offer a little less protection than TMR, but with significantly lower overheads.
Memory arrays and caches in microprocessors can be protected by the conventional error correction codes (ECCs), which have acceptable overheads. Protecting the general logic in the pipeline of a microprocessor has always been a challenge as TMR or duplication is too expensive. The previous work has proposed using ECC to protect the register file (RF) [2] , [3] , but the ECC bits need to be calculated and read during each operation. The performance and power overheads can be big for the RF [4] , and the situation gets worse when there are multiple read ports, and thus multiple ECC decoding circuitry is required. In addition, multiple-bit upsets (MBUs) and the captured SETs from combinational gates have become a serious issue at current technology nodes [5] , [6] . ECCs cannot address SETs, and are very expensive for addressing MBUs as they require a larger number of redundant bits.
Other techniques have been proposed to mitigate either the SETs or the SEUs in general logic [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . However, few of these can efficiently provide full protection of the whole pipeline against both SETs and SEUs. They are either only suitable for protecting the pipeline registers (such as RazorII [13] and soft-error mitigation (SEM)/soft-and timingerror mitigation (STEM) techniques [11] ), or only applicable in RFs [such as feedback redundant SEU/SET-tolerant latch (FERST) [10] ]. On the other hand, most of these techniques rely on hardware redundancies, but are not selfchecking, since errors occurring in the redundant circuitry can still corrupt data.
In this paper, we propose a novel pipeline protection technique based on self-checking radiation-hardened register architecture. The technique is capable of providing costeffective error tolerance for a microprocessor pipeline. Our first contribution is the design of the self-checking register architecture, which is developed from the soft-error-and timing-error-tolerant FF (SETTOFF), combined with a self-checker [4] , [14] . The self-checker mitigates any errors occurring in the error-tolerant circuitry of SETTOFF. The overhead of the self-checker is minimized by sharing it between multiple SETTOFFs in a register. Our second contribution is a pipeline protection technique, which incorporates the radiation-hardened self-checking registers into the RF, and the registers between each stage of the pipeline (henceforth, referred to as the pipeline registers). SEUs occurring during pipeline execution will be detected and corrected on the fly within the register architecture. SETs and timing errors (TEs) occurring in the combinational gates will be detected if captured by the pipeline registers or the RF. These errors then trigger a pipeline replay that reexecutes the operation and corrects the error by rewriting the corrupted registers. In addition, the redundant circuitry added for error tolerance within the register architecture is, in turn, protected by the self-checker, and thus total self-checking is realized. We demonstrate the pipeline protection technique in an OpenRISC 1200 microprocessor. A fault-analysis model is developed to evaluate the reliability of the processor pipeline. The results show that no errors can propagate through the pipeline into the data memory.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the literature related to the work. Section III presents the self-checking radiation-hardened register architecture. The design and implementation of the radiation hardening pipeline protection technique is given in Section IV, and Section V presents the experimental methodology and the evaluation results. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
The previous radiation hardening approaches fall into two main categories. Fault avoidance techniques aim to reduce the probability that the system is affected by particle strikes. Fault correction techniques detect and correct faults occurring in the system. Lin et al. [15] proposed a fault avoidance technique using a Schmitt trigger (ST) to construct radiation-hardened latches. The ST-based latch has 112% higher critical charge than a conventional latch and can be used to reduce the SET error rate. Garg et al. [16] also proposed a fault avoidance technique in which the diodes dissipate energy from SEUs. Another approach [17] aims to reconstruct circuit logic based on an error analysis, to make a combinational circuit less sensitive to soft errors. One fault correction technique [18] implements a coarse-grained reconfigurable architecture to include redundancy.
In actual system designs, the fault avoidance techniques and the fault correction techniques can be complementary. This section focuses on fault correction techniques, which aim to provide a cost-effective protection for the microprocessor pipelines.
A. Previous Pipeline Protection Techniques
RazorII is a pipeline protection technique proposed to tolerate both soft errors and TEs within the pipeline [13] . RazorII protection relies on error-detection latches in the pipeline registers. All the error correction is achieved by using an architectural replay, which reexecutes the faulty operation and overwrites the erroneous state. As a result of the replay recovery process, the RazorII protection may incur large instruction per cycle (IPC) overheads when the error rate is high, and may, therefore, impact the overall energy efficiency. In addition, RazorII is only suitable for protecting the pipeline registers, but cannot protect the registers that store the architectural state of the processor (such as the RF). Thus, the RazorII is not fully SEU-tolerant. The recovery operation can only correct SETs and TEs that occur in the preceding combinational gates, since they are detected during the write cycle of the FF, and the faulty operation can then be reexecuted. However, if an SEU is detected during the hold cycle of the FF, the recovery mechanism can no longer find the last operation that wrote to the FF and cannot reexecute it to overwrite the SEU. As a result, the RF is protected by ECC, and suffers from the usual ECC drawbacks. SEM and STEM [11] both utilize a variant of TMR to mitigate SETs and SEUs. The STEM cell also adds TE detection. One novelty of the techniques is that they remove error detection from the critical path, and therefore, the delay overhead is reduced, compared with the TMR FF. However, the area and power overheads of the SEM and STEM cells are approximately the same as or slightly bigger than the TMR FF since additional recovery circuitry is added. The large overhead makes these techniques inapplicable for protecting the RF, and therefore, they cannot achieve complete pipeline protection.
Error detection and correction FF structures to balance performance, power, and reliability of pipeline architectures have been proposed [19] . The four FFs provide different levels of error tolerance and overheads. By replacing the four FFs in the best storage locations of a pipeline, this approach can enhance circuit reliability with significantly lower overheads compared with SEM and built-in soft-error resilient (BISER) [9] . Similar to Razor, this approach focuses on protecting the pipeline registers rather than the RF, as the proposed FF architectures can tolerate SETs, but do not provide full SEU protection.
Stability violation-based fault detection [20] uses stability violation checking to detect SETs, SEUs, and aging effects. The method has been implemented in an OpenRISC core, but the reported area and power overheads are 40% and 43%, respectively, somewhat greater than achieved with SETOFF.
A confidence-driven computing (CDC) model is proposed in [21] for adaptive protection against transient faults. The approach estimates the confidence in a computation and allows repeated computations (in time or in space) to increase confidence. CDC has low overheads compared with the conventional error-tolerant techniques, but it requires a controller to trigger duplicate computations. It has a much larger error detection window (multiple clock cycles) than the Razor or rollback recovery techniques. CDC is efficient for enhancing the reliability of combinational logic in each pipeline stage, but does not aim to protect dense memory blocks such as the RF.
RF protection based on the FERST-hardened cell has been proposed [10] , [22] . FERST uses three C-elements to mitigate both SEUs and SETs at the input of the latch. FERST incurs nearly 100% area and power overheads. The main drawback of FERST is that a C-element is added in the signal path, which will induce a delay overhead of ∼70% in a 65-nm technology. This makes the FERST hard to use to protect the timing-critical pipeline registers. Even in the RF, the delay overhead of FERST can have big impact on the performance. 
B. Self-Checking Capability
Most pipeline protection techniques do not have a selfchecking capability and so are vulnerable to soft errors in the redundant, error-tolerance circuitry. The area and geometry of the redundancies determine the probability that the circuit is hit by particles, while the critical charge determines the vulnerability of the circuit to particle strikes. On the other hand, if the unprotected redundancies are in combinational logic, such as the ECC or the majority voter in TMR, they may produce SET pulses that can cause errors if captured in the following stage. If the redundancy is in a state holding element, such as the C-elements in FERST and BISER [9] , the particle strikes can produce SEUs in a similar manner to a latch, and corrupt the whole cell.
C. Time Redundancy-Based Error Detection
Because SETs occurring in the logic blocks only manifest themselves for a limited period of time, and will be recovered automatically, time redundancy-based error detection (TRD) moves duplication into the time-domain [12] , [23] . The technique is shown in Fig. 1 . With no hardware duplication, TRD can detect SETs that are manifest at the input of the FF with a maximum pulsewidth of
where D setup is the setup time of the error FF and D comp is the delay of the comparator. Such SETs, if captured by the main FF at t 0 , will recover at t 0 + δ − D setup − D comp , while the comparator will assert an error signal due to inconsistent inputs. Similarly, TEs with a delay no greater than D tr are also detected since the correct result will be presented at the input D when the comparison result is latched. This architecture can also detect SEUs in the main FF from t 0 to t 0 + δ − D setup − D comp , which is called the TRD interval. Although TRD is cost-efficient, it cannot correct. Moreover, SEUs occurring in the main FF outside the TRD interval will escape detection. This is dangerous, as SEUs cannot be recovered until the FF is overwritten by the next input.
III. SELF-CHECKING RADIATION-HARDENED REGISTER ARCHITECTURE
To overcome the drawbacks of the previous techniques, we propose a novel full pipeline protection scheme. The technique is based on a self-checking radiation-hardened register architecture that can address both SEUs occurring inside the register, and the SETs and TEs that are captured by the register. It has a self-checking capability that can, complementarily, protect the redundancies added for error tolerance. This section presents the circuit-level approach of the register architecture, which is developed from the SETTOFF radiation-hardened FF [14] , combined with a shared self-checker, adapted from that proposed in [4] .
A. SETTOFF Architecture
SETTOFF is a soft-error-and timing-error-tolerant flip-flop, which can recover the SEUs occurring inside the FF on the fly, and can detect the captured SETs and TEs that originate from the preceding combinational logic gates.
The architecture of SETTOFF is shown in Fig. 2 . The main FF is a conventional FF. For clarity, only the last storage unit (the inverter pair) is shown. Node N holds the state of the inverter pair. Q is the inverted value of node N in normal operation. The error-tolerant circuitry is divided into two parts, which work in turn during two intervals within a clock cycle. Part I is a TRD architecture adapted from [12] . The TRD part works during the TRD interval, which is equal to the high clock phase. It detects errors occurring during the write cycle, which includes captured SETs and TEs at the input, and the SEUs that flip node N during the TRD interval. On the detection of an error, Part I asserts the Error_SET signal that can be used to trigger a replay mechanism to reexecute the erroneous write operation and overwrite the errors in SETTOFF.
Part II is the transition detector (TD) architecture, which works during the TD interval (the low clock phase). SEUs that flip node N during the TD interval are interpreted as illegal transitions and are detected by the TD. A correction XOR-gate is used to replace the inverter driving the output Q of a conventional FF. In normal operation, the Error_SEU_bar signal stays high, such that the correction XOR-gate acts as a normal inverter. When an illegal transition (an SEU) is detected by the TD, it assigns 0 to Error_SEU_bar. The correction XOR-gate will then propagate N to Q to correct the SEU on the fly. A correction glitch is generated upon correction of the SEU due to the delay of the TD. The glitch is not a threat because, if captured by the SETTOFF in the following stage, it will be detected by the TRD part as an SET pulse. Notice that only the SEUs that corrupt node N are considered, others are masked. We discussed this in more detail previously [4] , [14] .
B. Circuit-Level Evaluation for SETTOFF
The SETTOFF circuit architecture was implemented in a 65-nm technology. The proposed error-tolerant architecture in SETTOFF was modeled in SPICE. A conventional D-type FF is used for the main FF in SETTOFF. The power consumption and performance (clock-to-Q delay and setup time) of SETTOFF was then measured by SPICE simulations, with 1.2 V supply voltage, and a 185-MHz clock. Table I shows the average power and performance overheads averaged over different transition times and load capacitances. The power consumption is measured with 10% activity rate, and the overhead is relative to a conventional FF with the same drive strength.
The reliability of SETTOFF is also evaluated using faultinjection and simulation in SPICE. Current sources are used to simulate the collected charge induced by particle strikes at circuit nodes. When sufficient charge is injected into a node, it will produce an SET or an SEU, depending on whether the node belongs to a combinational circuit or a storage element. During the simulation, the SEUs are injected into both the master and slave latches of the main FF in SETTOFF, and the SETs are injected at the input logic. The faults are injected at time instances distributed across the entire clock period. Table II shows the fault simulation results.
C. Register Architecture
The TRD-and TD-based parts in SETTOFF provide both SEU-and SET-tolerance for the main FF. However, the added error-tolerant architecture can itself be struck by radiation particles, and hence introduces extra vulnerability. For the TRD part, the radiation particle strikes can induce SEUs in the error FF, or SETs in the preceding comparator in the TRD part. Such SEUs or SETs, if captured by the error FF, can generate a false Error_S E T signal at the output of the TRD part. The false Error_S E T signal invokes an unnecessary replay execution, but cannot corrupt the system. The unnecessary replay operations only incur an IPC overhead. Similarly, the particle strikes in the TD-based part may propagate to its output, and hence induce an erroneous Error_S EU_bar signal, which can then propagate through the correction XOR-gate and corrupt the output of the FF. This section introduces a self-checking mechanism to address this problem.
The architecture of an n-bit self-checking register is shown in Fig. 3 . It is constructed from n SETTOFFs and a self-checker adapted from that in [4] . The self-checker can detect soft errors that corrupt the TDs in each SETTOFF, by monitoring the register output during the interval when TD is enabled. One self-checker is used to monitor all the outputs of all the SETTOFFs in the register through a parity checker. The parity checker is constructed as an n-input XOR-tree. Any illegal transitions occurring at the output of any single SETTOFF will change the parity, and therefore will be detected. Upon detection, the parity checker generates a transition at its output. Such transitions are then captured by the self-checker, which asserts the Error_TD_final signal.
The transistor-level design of the TD-checker (Fig. 4) is adapted from the TD built into SETTOFF [14] . The two delay chains of inverters and transmission gates remain unchanged. The dynamic OR-gate for capturing the implicit pulses generated by the delay chains is separated into two branches, both driven by the system clock. During the TRD interval, when the clock is high, nodes M1 and M2 are charged, the TD-checker is disabled, and both of the outputs, rising_tran and falling_tran, stay low. During the TD interval, when the clock is low, the TD-based part of SETTOFF is vulnerable to soft errors. Therefore, the two branches are both enabled to capture the pulses generated by the delay chain for the rising and falling transitions, respectively. Any rising transitions at the input of the TD-checker will discharge node M1 through transistors d1 and d3, and thus will be signaled at the output rising_tran. Similarly, any falling transitions will assert falling_tran through the respective branch.
The TD-checker can distinguish correction glitches from transitions caused by errors in the TD. A transition can only assert one of the two outputs of the TD-checker. However, a glitch consists of both a falling and a rising transition, and thus will assert both outputs of the TD-checker. The two outputs, rising_tran and falling_tran, are then XOR-ed to generate a valid error signal, which is asserted when only one of its input is high. The error signal will stay at 0 when both inputs are 0, or when both inputs are asserted due to a correction glitch.
Notice that there is a possibility that correction glitches at the output of the register will propagate through the Table III summarizes the types of errors that may occur in the proposed register; whether the errors can cause erroneous outputs; whether they can be tolerated; and how they are tolerated. The radiation-induced transient faults affecting the register can be categorized into five types: 1) captured SETs originating from the preceding combinational logic; 2) SEUs corrupting the output of the main FF; 3) errors corrupting the TRD part; 4) errors corrupting the TD-based part; and 5) errors corrupting the self-checker.
D. Error-Tolerance Analysis of the Self-Checking Register
The captured SETs and the SEUs in the main FF can induce erroneous outputs at the register, but they can be tolerated by the TRD-and TD-based parts, respectively. As discussed in Section III-C, errors corrupting the TRD part can induce a false Error_S E T signal, which invokes an unnecessary replay operation, but does not corrupt the output of the register. Therefore, these errors do not need to be addressed. The errors corrupting the TD-based part during the TD interval affect the register output through the correction XOR-gate, thus they are mitigated by the self-checker. The self-checker can also be affected by radiation strikes. SEUs can arise at the stateholding nodes, M1 and M2 of the TD-checker, which will invert either of its outputs, rising_tran or f alling_tran, and generate a false Error_T D_ f inal signal (Fig. 4) . As with the errors in the TRD part, the false Error_T D_ f inal signal does not corrupt the register output, since it will invoke a redundant recovery process. Therefore, the self-checker does not need to be protected.
The built-in TRD-and TD-based parts in each SETTOFF in the register allow the proposed register to tolerate an unlimited number of MBUs in multiple main FFs. The shared self-checker can also address the MBUs corrupting multiple TD-based parts during the same cycle. This is because the first corruption will be detected, and the recovery operation will then reset all the TDs in the register. However, if an even number of upsets simultaneously corrupt multiple TDs, they can escape detection since the parity of the register output will not change.
E. Register Evaluation
To verify and evaluate the method at subsystem level, a 32-bit self-checking register based on SETTOFF2 was synthesized in a 65-nm technology and simulated in SPICE. The supply voltage was 1.2 V. A 185-MHz symmetric clock was used to drive both the register (positive edge) and the error FF (negative edge) of the TRD part. The power consumption of the self-checking register was compared with a conventional register with the same operating conditions and drive strength. With a 10% activity rate for a single bit, the average power overhead of the proposed register is 33%, which is only a 5% increase over SETTOFF2 without the self-checking capability (Section III-B). In terms of area, a single SETTOFF2 requires 30 extra transistors. The proposed register only adds one self-checker, shared between bits, thus the area overhead increase is insignificant. Compared with a conventional register constructed from FFs with 32 transistors each, the area overhead of the 32-bit self-checking register is 136%. Since the self-checker is not added to the signal path of the register, the delay overhead of the register is comparable with that of a single SETTOFF2, with an average value of 16.5%. Compared with a technique such as TMR that induces over 200% power and area overheads, the self-checking register requires over 30% and 80% less area and power overheads, respectively.
A current source-based fault-injection mechanism was used to verify the reliability of the self-checking register. The redundancies in the register are separated into three parts: 1) the TRD part; 2) the TD-based part; and 3) the selfchecker. As described in Section III-D, the TRD part and the self-checker are not vulnerable to radiation strikes. Therefore, the transient fault-injection and simulation was only carried out in the TD-based part in each SETTOFF. Because only the errors flipping the state held by the TD during the TD interval can corrupt the output of the TD-based part in SETTOFF, a current source was used to inject SEUs into the TD during the TD interval. The 30 SEUs were injected into the TDs in each SETTOFF in the register, thus a total of 940 errors were simulated. The injection times of the SEUs were evenly distributed during the TD interval. The simulation results show that of the 940 SEUs, 884 were detected by the selfchecker, and only 56 errors (6%) were escaped. The escapes are caused by the delay of the parity checker, which causes the SEUs to reach the self-checker outside the TD interval. The problem can be addressed by using more self-checkers to reduce the number of the SETTOFFs sharing each of them, since this would allow a small parity checker with fewer levels of XOR-gates.
To validate the MBU-tolerant capability of the proposed register, multiple faults were injected into the register to corrupt multiple bits of the register simultaneously. The simulation results demonstrate that all the MBUs are either individually corrected on the fly at the outputs of the corrupted SETTOFFs, or detected by the TRD parts incorporated in each bit. Table IV compares the implementation overheads and errortolerance capabilities of several techniques for protecting a 32-bit register in a 65-nm technology. Notice that ECC is implemented with single-error correction double-error detection (SEC-DED) coding, which requires seven redundant bits for a 32-bit register. The delay overhead of ECC is big due to the large decoding block; therefore, an extra cycle may be required to reload the register for error correction. Due to the C-element added into the signal path, the delay overheads of FERST and BISER are similar to that of TMR. The area overhead of BISER is small since it uses the existing scan FFs as duplicates. STEM uses a variant of TMR, which removes the error correction from the signal path. The delay overhead of STEM is small. 1 Compared with other techniques, our proposed register incurs smaller overheads. In terms of reliability, only the proposed register and STEM can tolerate SETs, SEUs, and TEs; and only the proposed register has a self-checking capability. Errors occurring in the redundant circuit of other techniques may either corrupt the cells directly (e.g., FERST and BISER) or produce SET pulses (e.g., TMR, ECC, and STEM). 1 The delay overhead of STEM was not reported in [11] .
IV. SELF-CHECKING-HARDENED PIPELINE IN OpenRISC
The complete pipeline protection technique was realized in the pipeline of an OpenRISC 1200 microprocessor [24] . This is a 32-bit scalar RISC machine with a Harvard architecture [24] . It has a five-stage integer pipeline and a dual-port RF constructed from 32 general-purpose registers. A soft-error injection and analysis model has been developed to evaluate the reliability of the microprocessor through gate-level simulation. In this section, we present the design of the microprocessor pipeline, the implementation procedure, the evaluation methodology, and the results that show the reliability of the protected processor, and the error-tolerance overhead.
A. Soft-Error Vulnerability Analysis of the OpenRISC Pipeline
As discussed in Section I, the proposed technique aims to provide a cost-effective soft-error solution for a microprocessor pipeline for use in nonsafety-critical ground-level applications, such as mobile devices. It is, therefore, important to determine the most efficient way to incorporate the technique into the pipeline. This section analyses the soft-error vulnerability of the OpenRISC pipeline, on which the reliable pipeline design is based.
The idea of the proposed pipeline protection technique is to protect the registers within the pipeline using the self-checking radiation-hardened register described in Section III. Only the SETs and TEs captured by the registers can propagate through the pipeline; therefore, the pipeline protection technique can address both types of soft error within the pipeline. However, the large number of registers in the pipeline could mean big overheads to protect them all. In order to achieve effective protection, a system-level analysis was carried out to identify the soft-error vulnerability of different registers inside the pipeline. The registers that are most vulnerable to soft errors can then be selected for protection.
Mehdizadeh et al. [25] presented an analysis of the fault effects in the OpenRISC processor. They injected different types of faults (such as stuck-at faults and bit-flips) into the processor, and checked whether the execution results were corrupted. Their results show that different units in OR1200 present different vulnerabilities to the injected faults. The levels of vulnerability of different units are independent of software execution. The RF unit, for instance, is always more vulnerable than the write-back (WB)-multiplexer unit. Ebrahimi et al. [26] also presented an SER analysis of the OpenRISC processor in a 45-nm technology. Their results show that 75% of the FFs within the microprocessor make negligible contributions to the overall system SER, and by protecting the most vulnerable 20% FFs, the system SER caused by all the FFs can be reduced by 80%. They have also shown that the level of vulnerability of the FFs, again, has little dependence on different workloads. Based on these observations, a system-level SER analysis was developed.
The system-level analysis was realized by using a dynamic transient fault-injection and analysis model developed from the technique described in [27] . Transient faults were injected into the FFs of the pipeline of the processor during gate-level VHDL simulation. The simulation results were then collected to statistically analyze the soft-error effects in different parts of the system. Fig. 5 shows a D FF cell modified for transient fault simulation. Two fault-injection blocks, one for SET injection, and one for SEU injection are added. The SET injection block consists of two modified inverters at the input of the FF, such that the original input becomes an internal node, ID. The actual input of the modified FF, D, is the input of the SET-injection block. SETs are modeled as transients at the outputs of each inverter, which will propagate to the input of the FF. The SEU injection block is added to the output of the FF such that the original output becomes an internal signal (IQ). The SEU injection block injects SEUs (i.e., bit-flip errors) to the actual output of the modified FF (Q), by flipping the state of IQ.
The Error_trig signal is used to activate predetermined faults in either of the fault-injection blocks. When an SET is activated, the SET injection block will produce an SET pulse with predetermined width at ID. When an SEU is activated, IQ is inverted at Q to simulate the error, and the bit-flip is not recovered until the FF samples the new input D on the rising-edge of the Clk, which will overwrite the bit-flip and propagate IQ to Q.
Using this fault-injection technique, an analysis was carried out in the ORPSoc platform, which is the smallest-possible reference system for the OpenRISC processor [24] . During the simulation, a program was loaded into the processor and a fault-free simulation was run to extract the correct program outputs saved in the data memory. Afterward, the processor was reset, and the same program runs again with a single fault (either an SET or an SEU) activated at a random time instance. All the predetermined faults in all the FFs within the pipeline were activated one by one. When a fault propagated and corrupted the final outputs stored in the data memory after running the program, it was recorded as a visible soft error. Fig. 6 shows the soft-error vulnerability results for different registers within the pipeline, based on the execution of two programs: 1) quicksort and 2) tak. Regardless of the workload, the vulnerability levels of different registers are relatively constant. The PC register shows the highest vulnerability. A total of 90 transient faults were injected into the PC register during each program execution. The 31 (37.8%) and 34 (34.4%) faults caused corruptions in the execution results for quicksort and tak, respectively. This is because the faults occurring in the PC can easily corrupt the pipeline execution by fetching erroneous instructions. The FFs that store the control signals generated by the decoders in each stage of the pipeline present the second highest vulnerability. This is because the control signals are also critical to correct pipeline execution. Other registers that present relatively high vulnerabilities are: 1) the registers that store the instruction for the ID (id_insn) and IF stages (if_insn); 2) the registers that store the operand for the execution stage (op1 and op2); 3) the RF; and 4) the flag registers.
The registers that store the instructions in the EX (execution) stage (ex_insn register) and the WB stage (wb_insn register) had 0% vulnerability despite the injection of 198 transient faults in both benchmark executions. The reason for this is that most of the control signals are decoded in the IF and ID stages. The ex_insn register is very rarely used for instruction decoding in the EX stage, and hence, transient faults occurring in the ex_insn hardly affect the pipeline execution. Similarly, wb_insn is not used for the decoding process. wb_reg also manifested 0% vulnerability for both simulations. This is because wb_reg is only used for forwarding execution results in the WB stage back into the pipeline. Most of the time, the execution results written out from the WB stage are stored in the RF, which is then read in the ID stage where the execution results will be used for later instructions. Therefore, wb_reg has a low vulnerability to radiation hits. It should be noted that the low vulnerability of wb_reg does not mean that the WB stage of OpenRISC is not susceptible to soft errors, since the main storage in the WB stage, the RF, and the flag registers present high vulnerability.
B. Radiation-Hardened OpenRISC Pipeline
Based on the soft-error vulnerability results presented in Fig. 6 , a pipeline protection technique was developed in the OpenRISC 1200 microprocessor. The sequential cells, if_insn, id_insn, if_ctrls, id_ctrls, ex_ctrls, RF, flags, op1, op2, and PC are selected for protection since they manifest the highest vulnerabilities. The radiation-hardened pipeline design of the OpenRISC processor is shown in Fig. 7 . All the combinational logic blocks are represented by white boxes, while the sequential blocks (including the FFs, registers, and the caches) are represented by orange boxes. Notice that the memory access (MEM) stage is optional and is only invoked when a load or store instruction communicates with the data cache. Otherwise, the instruction goes directly to the WB stage after the execution (EX) stage and writes the execution results into the RF and the flag registers. The blue boxes are the pipeline registers.
The pipeline architecture can be divided into speculative and nonspeculative domains. The speculative domain consists of the IF, ID, and EX stages of the pipeline. The registers and FFs in the speculative domain commit speculative executions, which do not change the architectural state of the pipeline until the results are stored in the nonspeculative domain in the WB stage. The nonspeculative domain consists of the registers updated in the WB stage of the pipeline. These registers, such as the RF and the flag registers, contain the intermediate execution results and architectural states of the pipeline.
The vulnerable registers, if_insn, id_insn, op1, op2, the RF, and the flag registers, are all protected by the SETTOFFbased self-checking radiation register architectures proposed in Section III-C. The vulnerable FFs storing the control signals between each pipeline stage, if_ctrls, id_ctrls, and wb_ctrls, are replaced by the SETTOFF architecture. In order to realize the self-checking capability in these SETTOFF-protected FFs, two self-checkers are added, with one shared by the if_ctrls and id_ctrls FFs, and the other shared by the wb_ctrls FFs. The PC register is protected by TMR architecture since it is the most vulnerable part of the processor.
All the Error_TD signals from self-checkers for the registers and FFs in the speculative domain are OR-ed together. The resulting Error_TD_spec signal is fed into the pipeline recovery control unit to trigger corresponding recovery operations. Similarly, the Error_TD signals from self-checkers for the registers and FFs in the nonspeculative domain are also OR-ed together and fed into the control unit.
The Error_SET signals generated from the TRD part of the SETTOFFs in each register are OR-ed together. Meanwhile, the Error_SET signals generated from the FFs storing the control signals in the IF stage, ID stage, and EX stage are also OR-ed together. The resulting signals from these OR-ed Error_SET signals are shown by the red dashed arrows. The Error_SET signals generated by the registers and FFs in the speculative domain (including SET_spec1 to SET_spec6) are further OR-ed together, and the final result is fed into a shared error FF for speculative operations. Similarly, the Error_SET signals generated by the registers and FFs in the nonspeculative domain (including SET_nonspec1 to SET_nonspec3) are further OR-ed together, and the results are fed into a shared error FF for nonspeculative operations. Rather than generating a new delayed clock, we simply used the falling edge of the system clock to drive both of the error FFs. Certain constraints need to apply to the TRD part to effectively address the SETs. The realization of a sufficient TRD interval, and the approach for meeting the constraints required by the TRD part are further considered in Section V-B. Notice that the two error FFs only capture SET error signals during the write cycle of the registers when the TRD parts are enabled. The two error signals, SET_spec and SET_nonspec, are fed into a pipeline recovery control unit which controls the recovery operations within the pipeline. The principle of the recovery operations for the errors detected by the TRD parts is described in Section IV-C.
Two backup registers, backup_rd and backup_flag, are added to backup the destination register in the RF and the flag register, which are updated by the instructions in the WB stage. The backed-up data are used for restoring the RF and flag registers during the recovery operations for registers that are updated during the WB stage (see Section IV-C for details of the replay operation). Both of the backup registers are protected by TMR.
C. Error-Tolerance Operation in the Pipeline Architecture
Soft errors inside the pipeline can be randomly located. However, they can be categorized into three types.
1) SEUs that corrupt data stored in the registers.
2) SET pulses that are produced by the combinational logic.
3) Soft errors occurring in the redundant circuitry added for error-tolerance. As discussed in the previous sections, errors of type 1) can be detected and recovered on the fly at circuit level; therefore, no extra recovery operations are required.
For type 2) errors, the SETs occurring in each stage of the pipeline will be detected by the radiation-hardened registers incorporated in the corresponding stage when they are captured. An architectural recovery operation is then required for correcting such SETs. As is suggested by the two SET error signals (SET_spec and SET_nonspec) generated from the two FFs, there are two types of architectural replay recovery operations, which reexecute the instruction in either the EX stage or the WB stage, depending on the following three cases.
Case 1: If an SET occurs in the IF or ID stage of the pipeline, it will be detected by the SETTOFF-based sequential cells incorporated in the speculative domain of the pipeline. The detection of such SETs will assert the SET_spec error signal, which will trigger a replay operation at the beginning of the following cycle, before the SET contaminates the RF and the flag registers in the nonspeculative domain. Since in this case, the SET only corrupts the speculative operations, and none of the registers storing the architectural state of the pipeline are affected, the replay operation for Case 1 will simply flush the entire pipeline, refetch, and reexecute the instruction in the execution stage (i.e., the instruction in ex_insn) to overwrite the captured SET. Fig. 8 shows an example timing diagram for the recovery process of an SET captured by the id_insn (Case 1). PCn stands for the PC value for instruction INSNn. Here, the INSN3 captured by the id_insn at the rising clock edge of cycle 3 is corrupted by an SET occurring in the decoder in the IF stage.
If the pipeline is unprotected, the ID stage of the pipeline will decode the erroneous INSN3 stored in id_insn during cycle 3, and generate erroneous control signals to corrupt the execution stage. The corrupted execution results will then be forwarded to the registers in the nonspeculative domain (RF, flag registers, and wb_reg). However, in the protected pipeline, the captured SET is detected by the TRD part in id_insn at the falling clock edge of cycle 3, which asserts the SET_spec signal in the error FF for speculative operations. The SET_spec signal then triggers the recovery operation for Case 1. The recovery operation asserts the flushpipe signal, which flushes all the pipeline registers at the rising clock edge of cycle 4 to prevent the erroneous execution from propagating. The stallpipe signal is also asserted to stall the pipeline and disables all the registers from updating the results from executing the instruction INSN3 stored in ex_insn in cycle 4. The PC is rolled back to the PC value in the EX stage (i.e., the PC2), by the PC_rb signal. When the new PC value becomes available at cycle 6, the pipeline starts fetching the new instruction and the normal operation resumes (the NOP instruction does not contain any valid executions). The SET is not repeated in the IF stage during the reexecution in cycle 8, so that id_insn captures the correct INSN3 after the replay. The recovery process for Case 1 ensures that the errors in all pipeline registers in the speculative domain are overwritten during reexecution to prevent them corrupting the WB stage.
Case 2: If an SET occurs in the EX stage, it can corrupt the nonspeculative registers, such as the RF, the flag register, and the wb_ctrl FFs during the WB cycle. The recovery operation in this case will reexecute the instruction in the WB stage (i.e., the instruction in wb_insn) to rewrite the RF, the flag register, and the wb_ctrl FFs. However, unlike the replay operation in Case 1, the intermediate data and the architectural state of the pipeline might have been corrupted by the SET. These data and pipeline states may be used as operands or other operation conditions during the reexecution. Therefore, for Case 2, the RF and the flag register need to be restored using their backup registers before the recovery operation is committed. Fig. 9 shows an example timing diagram for the recovery process of an SET captured by the RF (Case 2). 2 When the execution in the EX stage is about to write its results into the destination register (Rd) in RF and the flag register, both Rd and the flag register are saved into their backup registers before they are updated. resultn and flagn stand for the execution results and the flags generated by the INSNn in the EX stage. In cycle 3, the captured result4 in Rd is corrupted by an SET occurring in the EX stage. The SET_nonspec signal is asserted upon detection, which invokes the recovery process for Case 2. The pipeline is flushed and stalled, while the PC is rolled back to the PC value in the WB stage (i.e., PC4), to refetch and reexecute the instruction in wb_insn (i.e., INSN4) which corrupts the RF. In addition, Rd and the flag register are restored by the backup registers in cycle 4 to ensure that the system state is consistent with the original execution during the reexecution. In cycle 10, Rd is reupdated and recovered by the reexecution. The recovery process for Case 2 ensures that the all SETs captured in the WB cycle can be mitigated.
Case 3: A third circumstance happens when a captured SET is detected while a branch instruction is executing. Fig. 10 shows the timing diagram for Case 3. PC2(brc) is the PC value for the branch instruction brc. PC100 is the branching address. In OpenRISC, the branch operation is committed in the ID stage to force the PC to jump to the branching address. Therefore, an invalid PC [PC3(dg)] is forwarded into the pipeline before the branching PC, to fetch INSN3. A dangerous situation can happen if an error is detected when INSN3 is in the ex_insn. In this case, refetching the instruction in ex_insn only forwards PC3(dg) into the pipeline; therefore, the branch instruction stored in PC2(brc) will not be executed during the replay. This results in the branch operation not being detected during the reexecution, such that the processor fails to jump to the branching address. The problem is solved by monitoring the branch operation within the pipeline, and when such a situation occurs, the branch PC in the WB stage [PC2(brc) in this case] is replayed, as shown in Fig. 10 . The error is corrected in cycle 11 in id_insn.
Most of the SETs detected by the TRD part are transient errors that will not occur again during the reexecution. In such cases, the recovery process can successfully recovers the error at one time. If other SETs occur during the replay operation, they will be detected and will trigger further replays until no error is detected.
Errors of type (3) include errors that corrupt the TRD part; the TD-based part; and the self-checker.
The errors that corrupt the TD-based part are detected by the self-checkers, which will also be recovered by the replay recovery mechanism for errors of type 2). The errors generated from the speculative domain will assert the Error_TD_spec signal (see Fig. 7 ), which will then trigger a replay execution to flush the pipeline, refetch, and reexecute the instruction in the EX stage. The errors from the nonspeculative domain will assert the Error_TD_nonspec signal, which triggers a replay execution that replays the instruction in the WB stage. During both replay operations, all the pipeline registers and FFs storing the control signals will be rewritten, such that all the TD-based parts in these cells are reset. The errors generated from the TD-based part of these cells will be recovered after the replay, when normal operation can resume. Nevertheless, if an error is detected from the TD-based parts in the RF or the flag register, the Error_TD signal will also trigger a reset signal to reset the TD-based parts in the corresponding register which generates the error, besides triggering the replay operation. This is because the RF and the flags might not be updated during the replay, such that the reset of TD may not be triggered automatically. The erroneous TD-based part can stay corrupted unless the reset operation for the TD is explicitly executed.
The errors corrupting the TRD part and the self-checker may produce a faulty error signal, triggering an unnecessary recovery process. However, such errors do not corrupt the pipeline execution results. Therefore, no extra recovery operations are involved.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS

A. Implementation Details and Error-Tolerance Overheads
The OpenRISC processor with the proposed radiationhardened pipeline architecture was synthesized to a 65-nm technology, with 1.2 V supply voltage and 185-MHz clock frequency. The transistor-level implementation of SETTOFF and the self-checker, which construct the radiation-hardened register architecture, were characterized as new cells using Synopsys Liberty NCX. The behavioral model of the OpenRISC 1200 processor was redesigned to incorporate the new pipeline architecture described in Section IV, and was then synthesized to cell level using the characterized technology library. The 32-bit pipeline registers and the registers in RF were replaced by the 32-bit proposed radiation-hardened registers. Gate-level simulation was carried out based on the ORPSoc platform, which provides the smallest-possible reference system for testing the processor [28] .
The implementation details of the SETTOFF2-based radiation-hardened OpenRISC processor are summarized in Table V . The results come from evaluating only the core of the processor; the power consumption and area of other parts of the processor, such as the caches and memory, were not considered. The total error-tolerance area overhead and power overhead for the radiation-hardened OpenRISC processor are 26.7% and 17.8%, respectively, and break down as follows: the incorporated replay recovery architecture and the TRD circuitry of all SETTOFF2s incur 13% more area and 2.4% more power consumption. A total of 956 buffers were inserted into the pipeline to achieve the timing constraint for the TRD parts. The inserted buffers incur 1.5% extra area and 0.5% more power consumption with respect to the whole processor core. A total number of 1219 SETTOFF2s and 39 self-checkers were incorporated. These self-checking architectures incur an area overhead of 12.1% and a power consumption overhead 
B. Setting TRD and TD Intervals and Clock Management
Only one clock is used for driving both the system FFs (by using the positive clock edge), and the error FFs in the TRD part (by using the negative edge of the clock). The TRD and TD intervals of the incorporated SETTOFF architectures are, hence, decided by the frequency and the duty cycle of the clock.
The choice of the TRD and TD intervals is based on providing desirable SET and SEU coverage. The two intervals formed by the two clock phases represent a tradeoff between SET-and SEU-tolerant capabilities. A bigger TRD interval allows more SETs with bigger widths to be addressed, while a bigger TD interval can detect and correct more SEUs on the fly. Since the SEUs that are not corrected during the TD interval will still be addressed during the TRD interval, the aim is then to provide a sufficient TRD interval to efficiently reduce both the SET and SEU failure rate of the SETTOFF. The widths of the potential SET pulses are the main factors for determining the TRD interval. As reported in [29] , the mean and the standard deviation of the width of the SET pulses in a 65-nm technology are 530 and 150 ps, respectively. According to the circuit-level evaluation results for SETTOFF presented in [14] , a minimum 800-ps TRD interval was chosen because it can reduce the SET failure rate of the SETTOFF to 0 in a 65-nm technology. With an 800-ps TRD interval, the SEU failure rate of the SETTOFF is also reduced to 0 since it covers all the correction glitches.
Finally, buffers were inserted into the shortest path of the combinational logic in each pipeline stage to satisfy the shortest path constraint of the TRD technique for all the incorporated radiation-hardened cells. The buffers that provide the maximum delay with minimum power consumption and area occupation were chosen to minimize the incurred overhead.
C. Reliability Analysis for the Radiation-Hardened Processor
The reliability and the implementation overheads of the proposed radiation-hardened processors were evaluated through gate-level simulations. The transient fault-injection technique and the simulation methodology used for analyzing the error vulnerability of the original OpenRISC described in Section IV-A were used for evaluating the reliability of the radiation-hardened processor. However, besides injecting transient faults into the original cells, the same method was also used to inject transient faults into the redundant circuitry of the processor added for error tolerance. To be specific, the transient faults injected into the redundant circuitry include the following.
1) SEUs injected into the TDs to corrupt the TD-based parts in SETTOFFs. 2) SEUs injected into the error FFs to corrupt the TRD-based parts in SETTOFFs. 3) SEUs injected into the TD-checkers to corrupt the self-checkers in the self-checking registers. 4) SEUs injected into the backup registers for the RF and flag register. Three programs, quicksort, tak, and a matrix multiplication program, were used for the fault simulation. The evaluation results are compared with the reliability results of an unprotected OpenRISC processor. Table VI shows the number of transient faults injected into each processor and the visible errors occurring in the data memories after running the programs. The same 4050 faults (including both SETs and SEUs) were injected into the original cells of each of the two processors. In order to carry out a comprehensive fault analysis and reliability evaluation, the locations of these faults cover all the vulnerable registers (the ones identified in Section IV-A) inside the pipeline. In addition, the occurrence times of the injected faults are randomly distributed across the entire clock cycle, and both SETs and SEUs were simulated for each bit of the vulnerable registers. All the injected faults incur 306, 305, and 354 errors in the original processor for the quicksort, tak, and matrix multiplication programs, respectively. All these errors, however, are mitigated in the protected OpenRISC processor. In particular, 287 errors of the 306 errors occurring in the quicksort program were recovered on the fly, while the rest (19 errors) were recovered by replay operations. Of the 305 errors occurring in the tak program, 290 were recovered on the fly and 15 errors were recovered through the architectural replay. The 344 of the 354 errors occurring in the matrix multiplication were recovered on the fly and the other ten errors were recovered by the replay operations. In addition, the transient faults injected into the redundant circuitry in the protected processor were also tolerated and did not induce any soft errors into the outputs of the programs.
D. Comparison With Razor and SEM/STEM Pipeline Protection
Both the RazorII pipeline protection technique and our proposed pipeline protection technique utilize an architectural replay recovery operation, which costs extra operation cycles and induces an IPC overhead. However, in our pipeline protection technique, most of the SEUs were detected in the TD interval and are recovered on the fly. As the fault-injection results showed in Section V-C, 93.8%, 95.1%, and 97.2% of the injected faults were recovered on the fly for quicksort, tak, and matrix multiplication programs, respectively. The replay operation is only triggered at a fairly low rate, at an average of 4.6% for the three programs. This is because replay is only required for correcting the captured SETs or TEs during the TRD interval. RazorII uses a conventional replay recovery mechanism and all the errors are recovered through reexecution. This means that the RazorII technique would need to recover 100% of the detected errors by using the replay operation. Therefore, the proposed pipeline protection induces a much smaller IPC overhead than the conventional replay recovery mechanism used in RazorII.
On the other hand, RazorII and SEM/STEM pipeline protection techniques cannot protect the WB stage of the pipeline and the registers that store the architectural states of the system during the WB stage, such as the RF and the flag registers. This is because RazorII cannot efficiently address SEUs, and the error-tolerance overhead is too big for SEM/STEM to protect the RF. Instead, they typically use a stabilizer buffer or register before the WB stage to make the WB stage nontiming-critical. Therefore, the TEs occurring in the WB stage are not considered. This also guarantees that no errors are forwarded into the RF during the recovery process since the RF does not have SET/TE tolerance capability (see [11] , [13] , [30] ). However, SETs occurring during the WB write cycle can still corrupt the registers that are updated during the cycle. The proposed pipeline protection eliminates this extra stabilizer and shrinks the pipeline depth compared with the previous pipeline protection techniques. Both the SETs occurring during the WB write cycle, and the SEUs occurring in the registers updated during the WB write cycle are tolerated by the incorporated proposed registers.
In terms of implementation overheads, the results in our previous paper show that a single SETTOFF has less or similar area, performance, and power consumption overheads compared with other radiation-hardened techniques [14] . In particular, the power overhead of SETTOFF is 28%, which is comparable with RazorII (28.5%-30%). The replay recovery feature implemented in the SETTOFF-protected pipeline is similar to that used for Razor pipeline protection; therefore, the implementation overheads incurred by the two replay features should also be comparable (although the replay feature in the SETTOFF technique is much less frequently triggered since most faults are recovered on the fly). Razor used ECC for protecting the RF; therefore, the power consumption overhead of the RF will be significantly larger than that of the SETTOFF-based pipeline protection, but the area overhead in Razor RF could be smaller (see Section V-E for detailed RF overhead numbers). The overall pipeline protection overheads of the two techniques should be comparable based on these observations. The SEM/STEM pipeline protection technique induces a much bigger overhead, similar to TMR.
E. Comparison With ECC-Based RF Protection
It has been demonstrated that our radiation-hardened register can efficiently protect the RF. The most commonly used ECC is SEC-DED coding which can correct single-bit errors and detect double errors. Although a later SEC-DED coding technique [31] improved the multiple-bit error-tolerance capability, it requires a large number of parity bits, and therefore induces high area and power overheads. Compared with the conventional SEC-DED RF protection technique, the proposed RF protection significantly improves the MBU-tolerance capability since each bit inside the protected RF has its own built-in error-tolerant circuitry. In addition, the previous research indicates that the majority of MBUs occurring in the RF are caused by the captured SETs originating in the combinational gates (such as the read and write logic) in the RF [32] . This is because the combinational logic has a high degree of fan-out, and the majority of the cell area within the RF is consumed by the read and write logic. As a result, the proposed pipeline technique can provide a noticeably better error tolerance than ECC, since ECC is not SET-tolerant.
Table VII summaries the error-tolerance capability of the two RFs. The SETTOFF technique can provide better MBU tolerance than the SEC-DED coding technique.
The implementation overheads of the two techniques for protecting the 32-× 32-bit RF in the OpenRISC are summarized in Table VIII . The ECC-protected RF is implemented with the SEC-DED code, which can correct single-bit errors and detect double-bit errors. Assuming a 10% activity rate for each bit, the SEC-DED-protected RF incurs an average 90% power overhead during a write cycle, while the proposed register consumes an average of 46% extra power. The self-checking RF incurs a delay overhead of 15.2% due to the extra loads added for error tolerance. The delay overhead of the SEC-DED-protected RF is big due to the large decoding block at the read port; therefore, extra cycles may be required to reload the register for error correction. The area overheads of the two robust RFs are estimated based on the number of transistors. For protecting a conventional 32-× 32-bit RF that is constructed with 11 618 equivalent NAND-gates, the SEC-DED technique requires 3442 extra equivalent NAND-gates whereas the SETTOFF technique requires 9106 extra equivalent NAND-gates. It should be noted that these results are derived for an RF with only one read port. The area and power overheads of the SEC-DED technique will increase significantly for protecting an RF with multiple read ports.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a complete pipeline protection mechanism realized on an OpenRISC microprocessor. The pipeline protection is achieved by incorporating SETTOFFbased self-checking cells into the most vulnerable sequential cells of the pipeline. A pipeline replay recovery mechanism is also developed at the architectural level to recover the errors detected by the hardened cells. The entire pipeline is protected; both SETs and SEUs occurring in each stage of the pipeline are detected by fault-tolerant cells in the corresponding stages. The proposed robust OpenRISC microprocessor was implemented in a 65-nm technology for evaluation. A cell-level transient fault-injection and simulation technique was used to automatically inject SETs and SEUs into different parts of the pipeline and to record errors caused by the injected faults. The fault simulation results show that the proposed processor pipeline is robust to both SEUs and SETs occurring in different pipeline stages. The overheads of the proposed technique for protecting the pipeline registers are smaller than or comparable with the previous low-cost techniques, while the power and performance overheads for protecting the RF are noticeably smaller than the conventional ECC. Future work will focus on developing reliable systems, which can satisfy both aggressive power and performance requirements.
